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CREATING KAIROS AT THE SUPREME COURT: 
SHELBY COUNTY, CITIZENS UNITED, HOBBY LOBBY,
AND THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF RIGHT 
MOMENTS
Linda L. Berger* 
[M]yth leads people to give their attention to one 
possibility rather than another, and hence to change the 
direction of their intentions and their dreams. Columbus 
proposed his expedition at the right time—the Kairos—
when people were ready to accept the discovery of a new 
world.1
*Linda Berger is Family Foundation Professor of Law at UNLV’s Boyd School of Law. 
Thank you to Andi Orwoll for research and editorial support; to Bryn Esplin for suggesting 
the study of kairos; to Teresa Godwin Phelps for illuminating this study; to Terry Pollman 
and Linda Edwards for ongoing and timely conversation; to Boyd School of Law for 
financial and collegial support; to Jeanne Price and the Boyd Law Library for answering 
every request; to Ruth Anne Robbins for consistent encouragement and clarifying 
comments; to the participants in the Applied Legal Storytelling Conference in London in 
2013 and the West Coast Rhetoric Scholarship Workshop at UNLV in 2014 for their 
helpful comments;  and to Thomas and Michael for time well spent. 
 1. ROLLO MAY, THE CRY FOR MYTH 92 (1991). May credits Paul Tillich with the 
translation of kairos as the “destined time.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Kairos captures the right moment within the chronos, or the 
entire sequence of moments. To realize kairos in this way, the 
author must grasp the right moment in time and space.2 One 
aspect of kairos is sensing the most opportune moment—what 
point in time—to make a particular argument or claim. The 
summer of 2015 was, for example, the right time to argue in 
favor of same-sex marriage in the United States.3 The second 
aspect of kairos is apprehending the essential moment—what 
space in time will “stand in” for and exemplify the crux of the 
problem.4 This kind of right space is exemplified by the due 
process challenge that distills its argument down to the image of 
the judge advising the defendant to stay away from the 
courtroom in order to stay “safe from the rage of the crowd” 
when the verdict is read.5
Kairos is an ancient rhetorical concept that was long 
neglected by rhetorical scholars,6 and its significance to legal 
 2. This essay’s definition of kairos is drawn from a number of sources (cited as 
appropriate), but it will differ from them in its emphasis and phrasing. The major 
difference is my use of both an internal chronological timeline (within the chronos of the 
problem to be solved) and an external chronos (within the often-judicial setting in which 
the claim or argument is being made). 
 3. That the time was right is of course confirmed by the June 2015 decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also Roadmap to Victory,
FREEDOM TO MARRY (n.d.), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/Roadmap-to-Victory 
(noting that Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), was decided after thirty-four states had 
ended bans on interracial marriage, and that Obergefell was decided after thirty-seven 
states had approved same-sex marriage). 
 4. This is similar to the use of metonymy to substitute a stand-in word or phrase for 
the whole argument (for example, money as a stand-in for corporate participation in 
political campaigns). 
 5. See infra part III(C). In Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), Justice Holmes 
wrote that 
we must look facts in the face . . . . And when we find the judgment of the expert 
on the spot [the trial judge] . . . to have been that if one juryman yielded to . . . . 
reasonable doubt . . ., neither prisoner nor counsel would be safe from the rage 
of the crowd, we think the presumption overwhelming that the jury responded to 
the passions of the mob. 
Id. at 349 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 6. See James L. Kinneavy, Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical Rhetoric in
RHETORIC AND PRAXIS: THE CONTRIBUTION OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC TO PRACTICAL 
REASONING 79, 80 (J.D. Moss, ed., 1986) (characterizing kairos as “neglect[ed] by many 
rhetoricians, both historical and contemporary”); see also James L. Kinneavy & Catherine 
R. Eskin, Kairos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 17 WRITTEN COMMUNC’N 432, 432–33 (2000) 
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argument and persuasion has been little discussed. Through their 
use of two words for time, chronos and kairos, the Greeks were 
able to view history as a grid of connected events spread across 
a landscape punctuated by hills and valleys.7 In chronos, the 
timekeeper-observer constructs a linear, measurable, 
quantitative accounting of what happened. In kairos, the 
participant-teller forms a more qualitative history by shaping 
individual moments into crises and turning points.8 From a 
rhetorical perspective, chronos is more closely allied with the 
narrative accounting for—how long? what next?—while kairos 
is the more metaphorical imagining as—at what point? in what 
space?9
I begin with a brief overview of kairos.10 Suggesting that it 
represents a quintessential judicial use of kairos, I next examine 
Justice Holmes’s dissent in Frank v. Mangum, the Supreme 
Court decision denying habeas relief to a Jewish factory 
manager later hanged by a mob in Georgia.11 Then I discuss the 
crucial lessons in kairos that can be drawn from pairing that 
dissent with Justice Holmes’s opinion for the Court in a 
seemingly indistinguishable case ten years later.12 I next 
consider recent examples of kairos: first as “the most opportune 
time” in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts marking a turning 
point in the life of the Voting Rights Act,13 and then as “the 
essential moment” in an opinion by Justice Alito expanding the 
(suggesting that scholars’ failure to examine kairos in Aristotle’s work reflects general 
scholarly neglect of topic); Philip Sipiora, Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos in
RHETORIC AND KAIROS: ESSAYS IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRAXIS 1, 1 (Phillip Sipiora & 
James S. Baumlin, eds. 2002) (noting that kairos is broader than mere timing, including 
aspects of what we think of as “propriety, occasion, . . . fitness, . . . decorum, [and] 
convenience,” among other concepts); John E. Smith, Time and Qualitative Time, 40 REV.
OF METAPHYSICS 3, 3 (1986).
 7. See Smith, supra note 6, at 6 (noting that time conceived as chronos “furnishes an 
essential grid upon which the processes of nature and of the historical order can be plotted 
and to that extent understood,” but also that time conceived as kairos acknowledges that 
“the chronos aspect reaches certain critical points at which a qualitative character begins to 
emerge, and when there are junctures of opportunity calling for human ingenuity in 
apprehending when the time is ‘right’”).
 8. See Smith, supra note 6, at 4–5 (discussing kairos as a special temporal position). 
 9. See id. at 4 (contrasting chronos as the quantitative with kairos as the qualitative). 
 10. See infra part II. 
 11. See infra part III. 
 12. See infra part IV. 
 13. See infra part V. 
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reach of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.14 The 
conclusion synthesizes these themes, addressing some 
advantages and limitations of kairos as rhetorical method. 
II. RECOGNIZING KAIROS
Clearly recognizable after the tipping point arrives, kairos
in its sense as the most opportune moment is illustrated by the 
rhetorical developments that followed Justice Scalia’s comment 
in United States v. Windsor15 that there would be no turning 
back the clock after the Supreme Court decision on the Defense 
of Marriage Act.16 The comment became a kairic fulcrum, a 
turning point for lower court judges who one after another began 
to invalidate state laws prohibiting same-sex marriages.17
Similarly, Citizens United v. FEC,18 characterized by some as 
having recognized free speech rights for corporations, appeared 
to carve out an opening for corporations to claim that they have 
the right to religious freedom and religious expression as well.19
As for kairos in the sense of capturing the essential 
moment, an illustration can be found in the petitioner’s brief 
filed in Miranda v. Arizona.20 Miranda had been charged with 
kidnapping and raping an eighteen-year-old girl.21 According to 
the brief, “[o]n March 13, 1963, defendant was arrested at his 
 14. See infra part VI. 
 15. 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 16. In dissent, Justice Scalia predicted that the ruling would extend to state statutes as 
well, declaring that 
[a]s far as this Court is concerned, no one should be fooled; it is just a matter of 
listening and waiting for the other shoe. 
By formally declaring anyone opposed to same-sex marriage an enemy of 
human decency, the majority arms well every challenger to a state law restricting 
marriage to its traditional definition. 
570 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 17. See Winning in Court, FREEDOM TO MARRY (n.d.), http://www.freedomtomarry.org
/pages/Winning-in-Court (including litigation timeline that shows a win in Massachusetts 
in 2004, wins in Connecticut and Iowa in 2009, and then wins in twenty-one states between 
2013 and early 2015).
 18. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 19. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
 21. Brief for Petitioner at *4, Miranda v. Ariz., 1966 WL 87732 (U.S., Jan. 19, 1966) 
(No. 759). 
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home and taken in custody to the police station where he was 
put in a lineup consisting of four persons.”22
After being identified by two witnesses, “Miranda was then 
taken to Interrogation Room 2 at the local police headquarters 
and there interrogated on both [this matter and an unrelated 
robbery].” Lest the reader fail to grasp the essential moment, the 
brief repeats the information with more detail: “After the lineup, 
it was Officer Cooley, who had arrested Miranda, who took 
petitioner to Interrogation Room 2.”23 The brief points out that 
no one told Miranda of his right to counsel,24 and then returns 
again: “Here, Officer Cooley also testified as to interrogation in 
Room 2 of the Detective Bureau, and narrated extensively a 
confession he attributed to the petitioner.”25 And yet again, the 
essential moment: “A written statement, obtained from Miranda 
while he was under the interrogation in Room 2, was then put 
into evidence.”26 And finally, the argument itself: 
When Miranda walked out of Interrogation Room 2 on 
March 13, 1963, his life for all practical purposes was over. 
Whatever happened later was inevitable; the die had been 
cast in that room at that time. There was no duress, no 
brutality. Yet when Miranda finished his conversation with 
Officers Cooley and Young, only the ceremonies of the law 
remained; in any realistic sense, his case was done.27
In the Miranda brief, Interrogation Room 2 became the 
actual physical place within a particular moment, a kairic space 
that captured the essence of Miranda’s argument: Unless the 
Constitution required police to tell a criminal defendant that he 
had the right to have an attorney present during his questioning, 
the defendant’s Constitutional rights at trial would be virtually 
meaningless. The defendant’s fate would rest on what he had 
said, without the benefit of counsel, while being interrogated by 
police, alone in a room for hours. 
 22. Id. at *4–*5. 
 23. Id. at *4. 
 24. Id. at *5. 
 25. Id.
 26. Id. at *5 (footnote omitted). 
 27. Id. at *10 (emphasis added). The brief went on to quote Justice Douglas’s 
observation that “what takes place in the secret confines of the police station may be more 
critical than what takes place at the trial.” Id. (quoting Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 
444–45 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
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A. Definitions from Classical to Contemporary 
The nuanced sense of timeliness afforded by the concept of 
kairos helps make an argument “more sensible, more rightful, 
and ultimately more persuasive.”28 In leveraging a particular 
point in time that is better for a particular purpose than any other 
point, kairos blends three related concepts: 
x At what point is this the right time (as opposed to 
any time)? 
x At what point is this the right setting—a context of 
tension, crisis, or conflict that calls for something 
other than a generalized solution that might work at 
any time? 
x At what point is this a fitting opportunity—a 
situation making a particular rhetorical response 
appropriate or presenting the chance to carry out a 
purpose that could not be accomplished at some 
other time?29
Kairos indicates that there is “an individual time having a 
critical ordinal position”—an actual turning point that is marked 
off from the time before and after.30 Contemporary rhetoric 
scholar John Poulakos suggests that kairos might even be 
thought of as the concept that “ideas have their place in time and 
unless . . . they are voiced at the precise moment they are called 
upon, they miss their chance.”31
In comparison with chronos, the familiar notion that things 
unfold as they do because events follow one another not only in 
 28. John Poulakos, Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric in CONTEMPORARY 
RHETORICAL THEORY: A READER 29 (John Louis Lucaites et al., eds. 1989).
 29. Smith, supra note 6, at 10–11.
 30. Id. at 10 (referring to kaori as “turning points in the historical order, the 
opportunities presented, the opportunities seized upon and the opportunities missed, the 
qualitative changes and transitions in the lives of individuals and nations and those 
constellations of events which made possible some outcome that could not have happened 
at any other time”).
 31. Poulakos, supra note 28, at 28.
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time but in causal connection,32 kairos is more ambiguous and 
complex. First, kairos is defined as meaning both the most 
opportune time—a particularly appropriate or fitting opportunity 
presenting itself to the writer or speaker—and the essential 
moment—the point in time that captures the essence of the 
problem or marks a crucial turning point.33
Next, while chronos appears closer to narrative, kairos is 
more metaphorical in both process and result. For example, in 
comparison with the storyline detailing the sequence of events 
over time, kairos is depicted as the discovery, creation, or 
capture of a crucial moment of time. Still, even though much of 
what we call storytelling is concerned with chronos—that is, 
with events arranged in a sequential chain to help us make sense 
of what happened (leading us to conclude, perhaps, that things 
happen for a reason)—kairos often plays the ah-ha-moment role 
in narrative. In the well-told story, we wait for the so-called tick-
tock, the kairos moment when things fit into place.34 The 
narrative arc of stories may depend on the magical moments 
when the curtain opens to unveil something previously 
unknown. Rather than a final act linking events together in a 
way that makes them understandable, this magical moment is an 
illustration of kairos within the chronos of a particular narrative. 
Chronos and kairos suggest differing authorial techniques, 
but even these are overlapping. Unlike the storyteller’s more 
passive passage through chronological time, kairos presumes 
that the author will intervene in history’s causal chain. In one of 
its senses, the kairos moment may appear to the writer or 
speaker as a door to be opened to a new possibility, a thread to 
be pulled to unravel the existing fabric. In another of its senses, 
the kairos moment provides the writer or speaker with the 
 32. As Jerome Bruner put it, “[w]e seem to have no other way of describing ‘lived 
time’ save in the form of a narrative.” Jerome Bruner, Life as Narrative, 54 SOC.
RESEARCH 11, 12 (1987).
 33. See Smith, supra note 6, at 10 (referring to turning points), 12 (characterizing a 
particular opportune moment as “‘right’ because it serves . . . [a] special purpose”). Smith 
writes that chronos is, in contrast to kairos, distinguished by three concepts: (1) the element 
of change or motion through a stretch of time, (2) the use of an appropriate unit of 
measurement, and (3) the element of serial order captured by the concepts of before and 
after. Id. at 6.
 34. FRANK KERMODE, THE SENSE OF AN ENDING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF 
FICTION 64 (1970).
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setting within which to portray what happens next as natural and 
inevitable. This natural inevitability is supplied by the things we 
already know, what the Greeks termed doxa—the implicit 
knowledge that operates automatically and unconsciously, so 
that it “goes without saying because it comes without saying.”35
Crucially, because what goes without saying depends on 
when, where, and who you are, the concept of kairos extends 
beyond time to include setting and to encompass author and 
audience. Aristotle’s descriptions of kairos include both the 
“right or opportune time to do something” and “the right 
measure in doing something.”36 The inclusion of a sense of 
appropriateness as part of the meaning of kairos is shown in the 
description of kairos as involving qualitative time (in contrast to 
chronos, which addresses quantitative time) and the companion 
description of kairic time as “a season” when a particular action 
is fitting.37 Thus, kairos incorporates a fully rhetorical sense of 
proportion—what is fitting or appropriate to this particular time 
and space. 
Finally, although kairos requires action by the speaker or 
writer, a kairic moment does not come about because the actor 
wills it into being. The active quality of kairos is captured in its 
definition as “a passing instant in which an opening appears 
which must be driven through with force if success is to be 
achieved.”38 That this is not only a subjective decision is 
suggested by the conclusion that even though kairos is initiated 
by action, it in fact enables a “dynamic interplay between 
objective and subjective, between opportunity as discerned and 
opportunity as defined . . . by including both objective and 
subjective dimensions of a moment in time.”39
To illustrate, compare kairos with the “rhetorical 
situation.”40 A rhetorical situation exists when an exigence (or 
 35. PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 167 (1977).
 36. Kinneavy & Eskin, supra note 6, at 433 (citing Kinneavy, supra note 6, at 80).
 37. Smith, supra note 6, at 6 (indicating that kairos is necessary for understanding 
times “at which a qualitative character begins to emerge, and when there are junctures of 
opportunity calling for human ingenuity in apprehending when the time is ‘right’”).
 38. ERIC CHARLES WHITE, KAIRONOMIA: ON THE WILL-TO-INVENT 13 (1987).
 39. Carolyn R. Miller, Kairos in the Rhetoric of Science in A RHETORIC OF DOING:
ESSAYS ON WRITTEN DISCOURSE IN HONOR OF JAMES L. KINNEAVY 312 (Stephen P. 
Witte et al., eds., 1992).
 40. Lloyd E. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHET. 1 (1968).
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 9 Side A      05/10/2016   12:12:25
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 9 Side A      05/10/2016   12:12:25
BERGERRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2016 12:04 PM 
CREATING KAIROS AT THE SUPREME COURT 155
imperfection) calls out for responsive rhetoric that is aimed at an 
audience with the potential to solve or address the 
imperfection.41 This view posits the rhetorical situation as 
existing objectively outside the speaker and as being discovered 
by the speaker (rather than as being constructed by the speaker). 
The concept of kairos appears more welcoming: The right time 
may be found or it may be created. Thus, while adherents of the 
rhetorical-situation view would say that kairos occurs when a 
crisis (or an exigence) has punctured the chronos, a critic of that 
definition would say that every moment has its kairos that can 
be seized and developed in strategic ways.42 Somewhere in 
between—and closer to the views of Miller, Smith, and 
Poulakos—is the view that the “tool” of kairos (the most 
opportune moment) and its “setting” (the essence of the 
problem) must act together.43
B. Examples from Fairy Tales to Science 
In one of its senses, the concept of kairos resembles 
metonymy: Its crystallization of the essential moment leaves us 
with a lasting image that stands in for and evokes a larger 
context, picture, or story. Fairy tales, for instance, may be 
captured in our memory as “a single event rather than a 
connected narrative.”44 When we think of Rapunzel, “[t]he 
image of the yards of hair tumbling down from the window in 
the tower is unforgettable.”45 Although we remember that 
 41. Id. at  2 (indicating that the situation calls the discourse into existence and reporting 
that “Clement Attlee once said that Winston Churchill went around looking for ‘finest 
hours,’” and noting that “[t]he point to observe is that Churchill found them—the crisis 
situations—and spoke in response to them”).
 42. Richard E. Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHET. 154, 159 
(1973) (asserting that the Cuban Missile Crisis was a political crisis largely created by 
rhetoric: “A President dramatically announced on nationwide television and radio that there 
was a grave crisis threatening the country. This was accompanied by symbolic crisis 
activity including troop and missile deployment, executive formation of ad hoc crisis 
committees, unavailability of high government officials, summoning of Congressional 
leaders, etc.”). 
 43. See Scott Consigny, Rhetoric and Its Situations, 7 PHIL. & RHET. 175, 181 (1974) 
(suggesting that the “real question” is how the user of rhetoric “can become engaged in the 
novel and indeterminate situation and yet have a means of making sense of it”).
 44. PHILIP PULLMAN, FAIRY TALES FROM THE BROTHERS GRIMM: A NEW ENGLISH
VERSION 63 (2012). 
 45. Id.
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image, we forget what happened before and after. “What about 
her poor parents, for example? They long for years to have a 
child, and then she’s born, and the witch takes her away and 
then we hear no more about them.”46 Rapunzel’s hair is the 
lasting image that crystallizes and forever after evokes the 
essence of the story. 
Another example of kairos as a lasting image can be found 
in the metaphor used to describe changing scientific accounts of 
the development of the universe. “Only a century ago the 
universe was held to be eternal and unchanging. Then came the 
expanding universe and the Big Bang, an origin almost biblical 
in nature, like a girl bursting out of a cake.”47 This singular 
moment—the metaphorical Big Bang—now marks our changed 
understanding of the nature of things. The image is isolated and 
essential, focusing our thoughts on one bead, rather than on a 
series of events strung together like links in a chain.48
As for kairos in its sense as “the most opportune moment,” 
an illustration can be found in the career path of the now-
conventional metaphor that the mind is a computer.49 When this 
metaphor was first used, it was novel, that is, the source domain 
(the computer) had not previously been applied to the target 
domain (the mind).50 To understand the metaphor, the reader 
had to try to align the characteristics and relationships existing 
within a computer with those existing within a mind: For 
example, both appear to take in data and to process it before 
producing some kind of report.51 Appearing at a most opportune 
time, when scientists had only recently begun to use computers 
in their everyday activities, the mind-as-computer metaphor 
generated not only a new way of seeing but also a new way of 
studying the mind.52
 46. Id.
 47. Dennis Overbye, A Quantum of Solace, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2013, at D1 (crediting 
the cake metaphor to cosmologist Fred Hoyle). 
 48. See id. (noting that “a single moment of insight or beauty or grace . . . can 
illuminate eternity”).
 49. Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Mind As Computer: Birth of a Metaphor,
9 CREATIVITY RES. J. 131, 131, 134–35 (1996).
50. See id. at 135–43.
51. See id. at 136.
 52. Id. at 142–43.
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To sum up, kairos may be understood as a concept 
incorporating time (the most opportune time); space (the 
essential point in time that embodies the story or the concept); 
action (the author’s use of the time and space); and fittingness 
(each of these matching up with the other). These characteristics 
can be seen in the spatial metaphors for kairos: In both weaving 
and archery, the Greeks conceived of kairos as an opening or an 
aperture “through which an arrow or a shuttle must be passed for 
success.”53 When used in this sense, kairos has both objective 
and subjective dimensions: The opening must be one into which 
the writer can fit his claim as well as one that the reader 
recognizes as real.54
III. JUDICIAL USE OF CHRONOS AND KAIROS
A. Introduction: The Phagan Murder and the Frank Lynching 
In the late summer and early fall of 1913, Leo Frank, the 
Jewish manager of a pencil factory in Atlanta, Georgia, was 
convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Mary 
Phagan, a thirteen-year-old girl who worked in the factory.55
When Frank’s case came before the Supreme Court at the end of 
a long line of motions and appeals, he was denied habeas 
relief.56 Based on claims that the trial had been disrupted by 
mass public outcry and tainted by strains of anti-Semitism, 
Georgia’s governor then commuted Frank’s death sentence.57
Within weeks, a group of Georgia residents planned and carried 
out Frank’s abduction from the state prison farm and his 
subsequent lynching.58 Decades later, Frank was posthumously 
 53. Miller, supra note 39, at 313.
 54. Id. (discussing scholarship as the opening of a space in existing research that will 
both accommodate new work and invite the reader’s acceptance of that work).
 55. STEVE ONEY, AND THE DEAD SHALL RISE: THE MURDER OF MARY PHAGAN AND 
THE LYNCHING OF LEO FRANK 190, 340–45, 377 (2004) (indicating that Frank’s trial 
started on July 28, that the jury returned its verdict on August 25, and that the court 
sentenced Frank on August 26). 
 56. Frank, 237 U.S. at 345.
 57. ONEY, supra note 55, at 488–503 (recounting the governor’s investigation and 
deliberation).
 58. Id. at 513–28, 561–72 (naming participants in abduction plan and describing 
lynching).
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 10 Side B      05/10/2016   12:12:25
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 10 Side B      05/10/2016   12:12:25
BERGERRESEND1RESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2016 12:04 PM 
158 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
pardoned, not on the grounds of innocence but on the basis that 
Georgia had failed to protect his rights.59
The Phagan murder and the Frank lynching are viewed as 
turning points in American history.60 The group of Georgia 
citizens who formed the Knights of Mary Phagan would help 
revive the Ku Klux Klan.61 Formed during the trial, the Anti-
Defamation League gained momentum after Frank’s lynching,62
which is believed to have been the only lynching of a Jewish 
victim in the United States.63 Some Jewish citizens left Atlanta 
after Frank’s lynching; others worked harder to appear no 
different from their non-Jewish neighbors.64
In the hundred years since the Frank trial, many historical 
and fictional versions have depicted the events and the 
atmosphere surrounding the investigation, the trial, and its 
aftermath.65 These histories demonstrate that common 
understandings of the events and their significance diverged 
 59. Id. at 647–49; see also Georgia Pardons Victim 70 Years after Lynching, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1986, at A16. 
 60. See ONEY, supra note 55, at 649. Readers interested in historians’ treatment of the 
case might consult Leonard Dinnerstein’s THE LEO FRANK CASE, published in 1968 by 
Columbia University Press, for an influential account. Many other sources are cited in 
ONEY, supra note 55, at 709–12. 
 61. ONEY, supra note 55, at 605 (noting that several men associated with the abduction 
were “reputedly among” those who orchestrated the Georgia Klan’s reappearance in 1915). 
 62. Id. at 617. 
 63. Peter Jacobs, The Lynching of a Jewish Man in Georgia 100 Years Ago Changed 
America Forever, BUSINESS INSIDER (AUG. 18, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/leo 
-frank-lynching-in-georgia-100-years-ago-changed-america-forever-2015-8 (characterizing 
Frank’s death as “[t]he only high-profile lynching of an American Jew”). Most victims of 
lynching were African-American. One recent accounting numbers nearly 3,500 African-
American victims of lynching in the Southern states between 1877 and 1950. Lynching, 
Whites & Negroes, 1882–1968, TUSKEGEE UNIV. ARCHIVES REPOSITORY (Sept. 9, 2010), 
http://192.203.127.197/archive/handle/123456789/511 (indicating in addition that from 
1882 to 1968, 39 whites and 492 African-Americans were lynched in Georgia alone). 
Another account documents 3,959 terror lynchings of African-Americans in Alabama, 
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia between 1877 and 1950. LYNCHING IN AMERICA:
CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR, REPORT SUMMARY 4–5 (2015). Georgia 
was one of the states with the highest absolute numbers of lynchings. Id. at 5. 
 64. ONEY, supra note 55, at 616–19. 
 65. MAROUF HASIAN JR., LEGAL MEMORIES AND AMNESIAS IN AMERICA’S
RHETORICAL CULTURE 135, 148 n. 1 (2000) (referring to “countless newspaper stories, 
hundreds of magazine articles, dozens of books, and at least four films” about the case, and 
collecting historical sources and scholarly studies). 
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along race, class, and gender lines; between the North and the 
South; and between progressives and populists.66
The section of this essay that follows this introduction 
concentrates on the interaction between historical and cultural 
turning points and the manner in which the Supreme Court 
addressed the habeas petition alleging that mob domination had 
overpowered the processes of justice in Frank’s trial. First, I 
compare the Supreme Court’s denial of Frank’s habeas petition 
with the dissent from Justice Holmes.67 After that, I contrast the 
Holmes dissent in Frank with Justice Holmes’s opinion for the 
Court in a similar case decided ten years later.68
This extended discussion is intended to suggest some ways 
to think, both theoretically and practically, about the concepts of 
kairos and chronos. After-the-fact rhetorical readings are able to 
look through a wider lens than is available to an appellate judge 
constrained by a record, a role, a line of precedent, and a 
standard of review. In Frank, the Court was seemingly stuck in 
time—the time captured within the record of the appeal. 
According to that record, a series of events had unfolded in 
chronological order, easily demonstrating that due process 
standards had been satisfied.69 In contrast to this chronological 
recounting, Justice Holmes’s dissent isolated and focused on a 
kairos moment punctuating the passage of chronological time.70
Like a documentary filmmaker, Justice Holmes turned the 
camera lens this way and that, and he was able to see and show 
not only the chronicle of events but also the crucial conflicts and 
tensions as they were embedded in the chronicle’s symbolic and 
exemplary moments. 
B. The Story of Leo Frank and Mary Phagan 
A few days after Mary Phagan’s body was found in the 
basement of the National Pencil Company factory, Leo Frank 
 66. Id. at 143–46. 
 67. See infra parts III(C) and III(D). 
 68. See infra part IV. 
 69. Frank, 237 U.S. at 344–45. 
 70. Id. at 345–46 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting “strong” anti-Frank hostility in 
courtroom crowd, applause upon announcement of guilty verdict, and the like). 
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was charged with her April 26, 1913, murder.71 Frank, the 
twenty-nine-year-old superintendent of the factory, had moved 
to Atlanta nearly five years earlier; he had earned an engineering 
degree from Cornell and had gained experience at companies in 
Massachusetts and New York.72 In Atlanta, he married Lucille 
Selig, the granddaughter of a co-founder of one of Atlanta’s 
synagogues, and in 1913, he was elected president of a lodge of 
the B’Nai Brith.73
Phagan, the thirteen-year-old daughter of a white farmer, 
had moved with her mother and stepfather from Marietta 
(twenty miles away) to Atlanta. There she started working part-
time in a factory at the age of ten. Following her first full-time 
job at eleven, she went to work at the National Pencil Company 
factory when she was twelve.74 On the day before her body was 
discovered in the basement, she had visited the factory to pick 
up her paycheck from Frank.75 He was the last person known to 
have seen her alive.76
Initially, there were several other suspects, including Newt 
Lee, the night watchman who found her body, and Jim Conley, a 
janitor at the factory.77 But the prosecutors decided that the bulk 
of the evidence pointed to Frank, and he was tried for and 
convicted of the murder.78 During the trial, the prosecutor 
portrayed Frank as a sexual pervert.79 Conley, the janitor who 
had been arrested in connection with the murder, admitted 
writing two notes found near Phagan’s body. During the trial, 
Conley claimed that Frank had confessed to the murder and that 
Frank had paid him to write down what Frank dictated and to 
help him move Phagan’s body.80
On August 26, 1913, after four weeks of testimony, the jury 
found Frank guilty in less than four hours, and the judge 
 71. ONEY, supra note 55, at 61–70. 
 72. Id. at 9–13. 
 73. Id
 74. Id. at 3–5. 
 75. Id. at 9, 29. 
 76. Id. at 62. 
 77. Id. at 22–33 (Lee), 118–44 (Conley). 
 78. Id. at 190–306, 340–44. 
 79. Id. at 363, 376 (referring to accusations of perversion and to “vile, vicious and 
damning stories”). 
 80. Id. at 238–57. 
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sentenced Frank to death.81 Before the verdict, fearing a possibly 
violent public reaction, the judge had advised Frank and his 
lawyer not to be present in the courtroom when the verdict was 
announced.82
After a series of unsuccessful appeals and amidst 
continuing public controversy and national news coverage, the 
Supreme Court denied Frank’s habeas petition.83 Frank’s 
sentence was subsequently commuted by Georgia Governor 
John Slaton.84 The same day, a mob made its way to the 
governor’s mansion, resulting in the declaration of martial law.85
In Marietta, where Phagan’s family had once lived, the governor 
was hanged in effigy, with a sign reading “John M. Slaton, King 
of the Jews and Traitor Governor of Georgia.”86
Several days later, a group of men gathered in Marietta and 
started planning.87 After an earlier effort was thwarted, the 
group of Marietta men who eventually traveled 150 miles to the 
Georgia State Prison Farm in Milledgeville encountered little 
resistance at its hospital, where they found and abducted 
Frank.88 Taken by car back to the grounds of a cotton gin in 
Marietta, Frank was hanged.89
According to several rhetorical analyses of the Frank trial, 
characterizations of race, gender, and class were crucial to its 
conduct and results. Phagan was described as a “perfectly 
innocent child,” and “the victim of a ‘pervert’” while Frank was 
a “Northern Jew.”90 Frank was also characterized as “highly 
‘nervous,’” and the prosecutor introduced evidence intended to 
show “a history of womanizing and ‘unnatural’ behavior.”91
 81. Id. at 340–44. 
 82. Id. at 340. 
 83. Frank, 237 U.S. at 345.
 84. ONEY, supra note 55, at 469–512. 
 85. Id. at 503–04. 
 86. Id. at 504–05. 
 87. Id. at 513–28. The group included a former governor and a judge, although they 
would not personally participate in all the events that followed. Id.
 88. Id. at 558–62. Frank was being treated in the prison hospital because he had been 
seriously injured in an attack by a fellow prisoner. Id. at 559. 
 89. Id. at 562–65. 
 90. HASIAN, supra note 65, at 132.
 91. Id. at 136.
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Conley played the role of the “‘good Negro,’ docile, single-
minded, and truthful.”92 According to one analyst, before the 
Frank trial, the public understanding of race in the South was 
predominantly binary: Blacks were poor, uneducated, and 
existed outside society.93 In contrast, “[w]hites were . . . those by 
whom and for whom the law courts had been created; in the 
courts, whites dispensed justice and received justice.”94 In 
Frank’s case, however, two black men had been considered as 
suspects and then passed over for prosecution.95 “Moreover, one 
of the principal witnesses [against Frank] was black, and this 
case is often cited as the first time a black man was allowed to 
testify in a Southern court against a white man.”96 What changed 
most, according at least one analysis, was the characterization of 
whiteness. “[W]hiteness was now openly contested and in some 
cases contingent.”97
Similarly, the trial affected the community’s views of 
gender and of what it meant to be “Southern.” Rather than the 
genteel Southern lady of means and refinement, a young girl 
who worked in a factory became the “iconic representation of a 
rural South that found itself violated by a financially healthy 
North.”98
C. Chronos and Justice Pitney 
Justice Pitney wrote for the Court in Frank.99 Both his 
reasoning and his holding were confined by the timeline of 
chronos, the linear passage of events over time as accounted for 
within the appellate record. Justice Pitney describes this view of 
the process to which Frank was subject: 
Frank, having been formally accused of a grave crime, was 
placed on trial before a court of competent jurisdiction, 
 92. Lolita Buckner Inniss, A Critical Legal Rhetoric Approach to In Re African-
American Slave Descendants Litigation, 24 J. OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECON. DEV. 649, 683 
(2010).
 93. Id. at 684.
 94. Id.
 95. Id.
 96. Id. at 685. 
 97. Id.
 98. Id. at 683 (quoting Hasian, supra note 65). 
 99. 237 U.S. at 309–45. 
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with a jury lawfully constituted; he had a public trial, 
deliberately conducted, with the benefit of counsel for his 
defense; he was found guilty and sentenced pursuant to the 
laws of the state; twice he has moved the trial court to grant 
a new trial, and once to set aside the verdict as a nullity; 
three times he has been heard upon appeal before the court 
of last resort of that state, and in every instance the adverse 
action of the trial court has been affirmed; his allegations of 
hostile public sentiment and disorder in and about the court 
room, improperly influencing the trial court and the jury 
against him, have been rejected because found untrue in 
point of fact upon evidence presumably justifying that 
finding, and which he has not produced in the present 
proceeding; his contention that his lawful rights were 
infringed because he was not permitted to be present when 
the jury rendered its verdict has been set aside because it 
was waived by his failure to raise the objection in due 
season when fully cognizant of the facts.100
After recounting these events, one following the other 
without any conflict to interrupt the flow, Justice Pitney 
concluded that “[Frank] has been convicted, and is now held in 
custody, under ‘due process of law’ within the meaning of the 
Constitution.”101 As Justice Pitney recounted the chronological 
lockstep of the judicial process, no outside facts from the 
defendant’s actual experience were allowed to intrude. The 
majority saw only that the appropriate forms of due process had 
been observed, one after the other: 
x the court had jurisdiction, 
x the jury was lawfully constituted, 
x the trial was public, and 
x the defendant had the benefit of counsel. 
In his prefatory statement reviewing the findings of the 
Georgia Supreme Court, Justice Pitney minimized the effects of 
the public’s behavior on the courtroom atmosphere by labeling 
 100. Id. at 344–45. 
 101. Id. at 345.
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the claims as involving two “innocuous matter[s].”102 He 
attributed the first claim, spectators laughing during the 
defendant’s evidence, to “a witty answer by the [defense’s] 
witness.”103 As for the second, “spectators applaud[ing] the 
result of a colloquy between the solicitor general and counsel for 
the accused,”104 he wrote that the judge quickly remedied the 
problem by expressing disapproval and calling on the sheriff to 
maintain order.105
Based on affidavits from jurors who said they were not 
affected, Justice Pitney rejected Frank’s claims that loud 
cheering in the streets had affected the jury as its members were 
polled.106 He further discounted the effects of the public reaction 
on the jury by evaluating as a separate matter the trial judge’s 
advice to the defendant and his lawyer to stay out of the 
courtroom when the verdict was announced for fear of violent 
reprisal.107 By isolating this point from his discussion of order 
within the courtroom, Justice Pitney was able to sidestep the 
combined inference that the judge and the jury felt pressured by 
the crowd inside the room and gathered outside in the streets.108
Although Justice Pitney addressed Frank’s account of what 
happened during the trial, both inside and outside the courtroom, 
he discussed it only to discredit it: 
[T]he petition contains a narrative of disorder, hostile 
manifestations, and uproar, which, if it stood alone, and 
were taken as true, may be conceded to show an 
environment inconsistent with a fair trial and an impartial 
verdict. But to consider this as standing alone is to take a 
wholly superficial view.109
While acknowledging the “narrative,” Justice Pitney 
characterized it as incomplete or irrelevant. It had already been 
examined and dismissed by both the trial court and the Georgia 




 106. Id. at 314.
 107. Id. at 315–16.
 108. Id.
 109. Id. at 332.
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Supreme Court, and so Justice Pitney implied that it was 
unnecessary for his Court to review it.110
Justice Pitney framed the issues narrowly, as questions of 
procedure, starting with whether the case was even properly 
before the Court.111 Once he concluded that the case was 
properly brought, he emphasized the continuing procedural 
nature of the case: 
[T]he essential question before us . . . is not the guilt or 
innocence of the prisoner, or the truth of any particular fact 
asserted by him, but whether the state, taking into view the 
entire course of its procedure, has deprived him of due 
process of law.112
Finally, he found that Frank had made a procedural error: He 
waited too long to raise an objection to his having been absent as 
the jury delivered the verdict.113 By the time Justice Pitney 
reached the question presented, it was a foregone conclusion that 
Frank had received all the process that was due. 
D. Kairos and Justice Holmes 
Before filing the habeas petition raising the due process 
challenge, Frank had applied to two Supreme Court Justices for 
review of the denial of a new trial based on his absence from the 
court when the jury returned its verdict. As had Justice Lamar, 
Justice Holmes declined to issue the writ,114 saying that he was 
bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia, but 
declaring that 
[o]n these facts, I very seriously doubt if the petitioner 
(Frank) has had due process of law—not on the ground of 
his absence when the verdict was rendered so much as 
because of the trial taking place in the presence of a hostile 
demonstration and seemingly dangerous crowd, thought by 
 110. Id. at 333.
 111. Id. at 333–35.
 112. Id. at 334.
 113. Id. at 339–40 (noting that Frank’s first new-trial motion did not raise this ground).
 114. ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF 
LIBERTY 56 (2003). 
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the presiding Judge to be ready for violence unless a verdict 
of guilty was rendered.115
Later, in his dissent from denial of the habeas petition, 
Justice Holmes gave a much different account of the due process 
record than had Justice Pitney, focusing on moments during the 
trial rather than on the tidy chronology of the appellate process: 
The trial began on July 28, 1913, at Atlanta, and was 
carried on in a court packed with spectators and surrounded 
by a crowd outside, all strongly hostile to the petitioner. On 
Saturday, August 23, this hostility was sufficient to lead the 
judge to confer in the presence of the jury with the chief of 
police of Atlanta and the colonel of the Fifth Georgia 
Regiment, stationed in that city, both of whom were known 
to the jury.116
Justice Holmes pointed out that members of the press had 
asked the court not to continue proceedings that evening because 
of the potential danger, and that the court had adjourned until the 
following Monday.117 Further, “[o]n that morning, when the 
solicitor general entered the court, he was greeted with applause, 
stamping of feet and clapping of hands,” and the judge advised 
Frank’s counsel that it would be safer if not only Frank but also 
his lawyer were not present in the courtroom when the verdict 
was returned.118 Finally, Justice Holmes focused again on the 
public’s response: “When the verdict was rendered, and before 
more than one of the jurymen had been polled, there was such a 
roar of applause that the polling could not go on until order was 
restored.”119
From Justice Holmes’s opinion, the reader learns that what 
Justice Pitney characterized as a routine “public trial” that 
proceeded according to form120 was in fact a trial carried out in a 
courtroom packed with hostile spectators who clapped their 
hands and stamped their feet with approval when the solicitor 
general entered and then applauded again when the verdict was 
 115. ONEY, supra note 55, at 449.
 116. Frank, 237 U.S. at 345 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
 117. Id. at 345–46 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
 118. Id. at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
 119. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting)
 120. See text accompanying notes 100 & 101, supra.
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rendered.121 From Justice Holmes’s opinion, the reader learns 
that even though Frank was represented by counsel, his counsel 
was advised that it would be safer for him and Frank to be 
absent from the courtroom when the verdict was returned.122
Through these kinds of concrete details focusing on key 
moments from the conduct of the trial, Justice Holmes provided 
a basis for his conclusion that even if the process observed the 
appropriate form, the form itself was “empty.”123
Even as he renders an apparently straightforward and 
chronological version of the facts, Justice Holmes carves out 
space, an opening for the distilled image of these points in time: 
As a result of these circumstances, “the trial was dominated by a 
hostile mob and was nothing but an empty form.”124
IV. JUSTICE HOLMES AND KAIROS REALIZED
Not only does the past inform the present case, but the 
decision in the present case changes the past.125
Less than a decade after the decision in Frank, an almost 
indistinguishable trial and appellate process took place in 
Arkansas, where five African-Americans were convicted of 
murder and sentenced to death following a series of race riots.126
Again the Supreme Court received a habeas petition raising the 
same due process issue decided in Frank, which had not been 
overruled or reconsidered in the intervening years. Yet the 
outcome in Moore v. Dempsey, with Justice Holmes writing for 
the Court, was an order directing the trial court to undertake an 
independent examination of the facts in the petition to determine 
if a due process violation had taken place.127
 121. Id. at 345–46 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
 122. Id. at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
 123. Id. at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
 124. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
 125. LINDA ROSS MEYER, THE JUSTICE OF MERCY 30 (2010). 
 126. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 89 (1923) (noting that, during the trial, “[t]he 
Court and neighborhood were thronged with an adverse crowd that threatened the most 
dangerous consequences to anyone interfering with the desired result”). 
 127. Id. at 92 (concluding that “the District Judge should find whether the facts alleged 
are true and whether they can be explained so far as to leave the state proceedings 
undisturbed” and directing that the case was “to stand for hearing before the District 
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Although the composition of the Court had shifted, kairos 
suggests that changed membership alone fails to explain the 
change in outcome.128 Instead, Justice Holmes used the kairic 
opening he had begun to construct in Frank to send the denial of 
habeas back to the trial court for fact-finding.129 When he wrote 
for the Moore majority, Justice Holmes gave no hint that he was 
in effect reversing the holding in Frank. In its structure and 
effect, Justice Holmes’s decision in Moore is a quintessential 
example of the judicial use of kairos to bring about changes in 
the law.130
In Moore, the five defendants had been convicted of 
murder in the first degree and sentenced to death.131 Their 
attorney called no witnesses, their trial lasted forty-five minutes, 
and the jury deliberated for five minutes.132 After a lengthy 
appellate process, the defendants eventually filed a habeas 
petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Arkansas, claiming that they had been denied due 
process because their trial was a trial only in form, not in 
substance, and that they were convicted under the pressure of a 
mob.133
Court”). The hearing ordered in Moore was never held. J. S. Waterman & E. E. Overton, 
The Aftermath of Moore v. Dempsey, 18 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 117, 122 (1933). Instead, the 
defendants’ counsel agreed to dismiss the petition if the prisoners’ death sentences were 
commuted to twelve years. Id. Six years later, the prisoners received indefinite furloughs. 
Id. at 122–23. 
 128. See Eric M. Freedman, Leo Frank Lives: Untangling The Historical Roots of 
Meaningful Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467, 
1499–1501 (2000) (indicating that almost half the Justices hearing Moore had not been on 
the Court when Frank was decided, but also pointing out that both lynchings and public 
concern about lynching were increasing when Moore was decided, and that the NAACP 
was then involved in a highly visible campaign in support of a federal anti-lynching law). 
 129. Moore, 261 U.S. at 92. 
 130. See Freedman, supra note 128, at 1472 (recognizing that both Frank and Moore
“require in-depth federal habeas corpus review of state prisoner convictions” and 
concluding that their differing outcomes “reflect no more than differing discretionary 
determinations in specific factual settings”); see also Colin Starger, Expanding Stare 
Decisis: The Role of Precedent in the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY.
L.A. L. Rev. 77 (2012) (mapping due-process doctrine as a continuing argument involving 
differing schools of legal thought). 
 131. 261 U.S. at 89–90. 
 132. Id. at 89. 
 133. Id. at 87. 
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According to the petition, as re-stated by Justice Holmes, 
x On the night of September 30, 1919, a number of 
colored people assembled in their church were 
attacked and fired upon by a body of white men, 
and in the disturbance that followed a white man 
was killed.134
x [This event] was followed by the hunting down and 
shooting of many Negroes and also by the killing 
on October 1 of one Clinton Lee, a white man, for 
whose murder the petitioners were indicted.135
Following these killings, Justice Holmes notes, the 
government and the community responded in ways that were 
woven into the social fabric of the time and place: 
x A Committee of Seven was appointed by the 
Governor in regard to what the committee called 
the “insurrection” in the county.136
x Shortly after the arrest of the petitioners a mob 
marched to the jail for the purpose of lynching 
them but were prevented by the presence of United 
States troops and the promise of some of the 
Committee of Seven and other leading officials that 
if the mob would refrain . . . they would execute 
those found guilty in the form of law.137
Justice Holmes then describes the defendants meeting their 
lawyer on the day their trial began, which was also the day on 
which it ended, for it took less than an hour: 
 134. Id. For purposes of this analysis, I have presented individual sentences from the 
opinion as individual bullet points. In the original, some are combined and some are not. 
 135. Id.
 136. Id. at 88. 
 137. Id. at 88–89. 
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x On November 3 the petitioners were brought into 
Court, informed that a certain lawyer was 
appointed their counsel and were placed on trial 
before a white jury—blacks being systematically 
excluded from both grand and petit juries.138
x The Court and neighborhood were thronged with 
an adverse crowd that threatened the most 
dangerous consequences to anyone interfering with 
the desired result.139
x The counsel did not venture to demand delay or a 
change of venue, to challenge a juryman or to ask 
for separate trials.140
x He had had no preliminary consultation with the 
accused, called no witnesses for the defence 
although they could have been produced, and did 
not put the defendants on the stand.141
x The trial lasted about three-quarters of an hour and 
in less than five minutes the jury brought in a 
verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree.142
After thus re-accounting for the facts as expressed by the 
Moore petitioners, Justice Holmes turned to the law, 
characterizing the majority opinion in Frank in a wholly new 
light. There, he said,
it was recognized of course that if in fact a trial is 
dominated by a mob so that there is an actual interference 
with the course of justice, there is a departure from due 
process of law; and that “if the State, supplying no 
corrective process, carries into execution a judgment of 
death or imprisonment based upon a verdict thus produced 
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by mob domination, the State deprives the accused of his 
life or liberty without due process of law.”143
Even though “mere mistakes of law” are not to be corrected 
by habeas corpus, Justice Holmes emphasized that these kinds of 
mistakes were not what was at stake in Moore.144 Instead, 
if the case is that the whole proceeding is a mask—that 
counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an 
irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State Courts 
failed to correct the wrong, neither perfection in the 
machinery for correction nor the possibility that the trial 
court and counsel saw no other way of avoiding an 
immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from 
securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights.145
To further explain and support his reversal and order that the 
district court hear the facts of the case, Justice Holmes provided 
no further authorities or justification. And he referred not at all 
to the question of whether the Court’s opinion in Moore marked 
a change in the principles established in Frank. Instead, he wrote 
only that the Court would 
not say more concerning the corrective process afforded to 
the petitioners than that it does not seem to us sufficient to 
allow a Judge of the United States to escape the duty of 
examining the facts for himself when if true as alleged they 
make the trial absolutely void.146
Dissenting, Justice McReynolds uncovered the opening that 
Justice Holmes had quietly constructed and complained that the 
majority opinion in Frank had been set aside: 
In [Frank], after great consideration a majority of this court 
approved the doctrine which should be applied here. The 
doctrine is right and wholesome. I can not agree now to put 
it aside and substitute the views expressed by the minority 
of the court in that cause.147
He went on to consider the record, virtually echoing the majority 
in Frank by finding that there was nothing unusual in a record 
silent about irregularities. Instead, the record as he recounted it 
 143. Id. at 90–91. 
 144. Id. at 91. 
 145. Id.
 146. Id. at 92. 
 147. Id. at 93 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
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seemingly captured the deliberate due process of the judicial 
system:148
x There was the complete record of the cause in the 
state courts—trial and Supreme—showing no 
irregularity.149
x After indictment the defendants were arraigned for 
trial and eminent counsel appointed to defend 
them. 
x He cross-examined the witnesses, made 
exceptions, and evidently was careful to 
preserve a full and complete transcript of 
the proceedings.150
x The trial was unusually short but there is nothing in 
the record to indicate that it was illegally 
hastened.151
x November 3, 1919, the jury returned a verdict of 
“guilty”; November 11th the defendants were 
sentenced to be executed on December 27th; 
December 20th new counsel chosen by them or 
their friends moved for a new trial and supported 
the motion by affidavits.152
x This motion questioned the validity of the 
conviction upon the very grounds now 
advanced.153
Given this accounting, Justice McReynolds concluded that he 
was “unable to say that the District Judge, acquainted with local 
 148. As before, I have presented individual sentences from this opinion as separate 
bullet points. 
 149. Id. at 96 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).  
 150. Id. (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
 152. Id. at 96–97 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. at 97 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
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conditions, erred when he held the petition for the writ of habeas 
corpus insufficient.”154
In Moore as in Frank, Justice Holmes appeared to provide 
a conventionally chronological accounting for the facts of the 
trial. But within  that chronological account, he carved away the 
outward form of the trial to show the essential space within, the 
points in time from which it appeared clear that a mob had 
dominated the judicial process. Taking advantage of the opening 
that first emerged in his Frank dissent, Justice Holmes was able 
to move through it to order a new hearing in Moore: If in fact 
the trial has been dominated by a mob, there has been no due 
process. Given that, the trial court must be given the opportunity 
to make the crucial factual finding on remand. 
The kairos explanation of Justice Holmes’s work turns on 
timely intersections. The time for recognizing the empty form of 
a trial was not yet opportune when Justice Holmes wrote his 
Frank dissent. But that dissent pulled a thread in the tightly 
woven judicial fabric constructed by law, history, culture, and 
social forces. By the time of Moore, the weave had loosened, the 
fabric had become more open, and Justice Holmes was able to 
tear an opening that was large enough to accommodate his 
ruling.
V. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, KAIROS,
AND THE LIFE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Much as Justice Holmes used his dissent in Frank to set up 
an opportune moment nearly ten years later in Moore, Chief 
Justice Roberts constructed a kairic moment by crafting a 
compromise majority opinion on the Voting Rights Act 
(VRA).155 Through this means, Chief Justice Roberts was able 
 154. Id. at 101 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
 155. Many thanks to Ruth Anne Robbins for reminding me that I expressed this concept 
at a presentation about kairos. Others have suggested similar concepts in different terms, 
including at least one reference to the embedding of “time bombs” in opinions to be 
detonated in later cases. Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time 
Bombs, and Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779 
(2012). Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Ginsburg are said to have sent “messages about the 
kinds of cases they would like to hear” in recent opinions. Adam Liptak, With Subtle 
Signals, Justices Request the Cases They Want to Hear, N.Y. TIMES A14 (July 7, 2015) 
(referring to Justice Kennedy’s apparent interest in the Court’s receiving a case about 
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later to take advantage of an opportune moment that changed the 
course of the VRA. 
The opportunity was seeded in Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District No. 1 v. Holder,156 decided with only Justice 
Thomas in dissent. The opportunity was harvested in Shelby
County v. Holder,157 in which the Chief Justice “relied heavily 
on his opinion in a predecessor case [Northwest Austin] . . . that 
expressed strong constitutional doubts about the Voting Rights 
Act but stopped just short of pulling the trigger.”158 The Justices 
who might have been expected to preserve the VRA were silent 
when the majority in Northwest Austin expressed its 
constitutional doubts.159 And by that silence, they effectively 
signed on to the chief justice’s critique of Section 5—his 
now famous claim that “things have changed in the South,” 
as well as his assertion that the Voting Rights Act’s past 
accomplishment was not by itself “adequate justification to 
retain the preclearance requirements.”160
Because they did not dissent, “the liberal justices even 
subscribed to the argument that ‘a departure from the 
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing 
that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently 
related to the problem that it targets.’”161 This “fundamental 
principle” was a centerpiece of Chief Justice Roberts’s later 
opinion in Shelby County, becoming “the constitutional basis for 
his critique of requiring some states but not others to obtain the 
federal government’s approval before making changes in voting 
procedures.”162
solitary confinement and to Justices Breyer and Ginsburg’s apparent interest in its 
receiving a case about the death penalty). 
 156. 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
 157. ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 158. Linda Greenhouse, The Cost of Compromise, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (July 10, 
2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/the-cost-of-compromise/. 
 159. Id. (characterizing the Court’s “liberal bloc at the time” as consisting of Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter, and suggesting that they had joined the earlier opinion in 
order to buy the VRA a little more time—hoping, perhaps, that Congress would update it 
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Emphasizing the opening created by the compromise in 
Northwest Austin, Chief Justice Roberts reminded the Shelby
County dissenters that they had agreed to this: “Eight members 
of the court subscribed to these views”163 in Northwest Austin.
He even chastised the dissent for “analyz[ing] the question 
presented as if our decision in Northwest Austin never 
happened,” and for “refus[ing] to consider the principle of equal 
sovereignty, despite Northwest Austin’s emphasis on its 
significance.”164
Chief Justice Roberts’s movement through the opening he 
created is kairic in every sense, emphasizing the crucial 
interplay of time, place, and opportunity for action. First, he 
characterized the VRA as a one-in-a-million legislative response 
to a once-in-a-lifetime situation: It “employed extraordinary 
measures to address an extraordinary problem.”165 The 
requirement that states get federal permission before enacting 
laws about voting was “a drastic departure from basic principles 
of federalism,”166 as was the requirement’s application to only 
some states—“an equally dramatic departure from the principle 
that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.”167
Then, he turned to the kairic setting he had created: 
Granted that voting discrimination still exists, the question of the 
moment was whether the “current burdens” were “justified by 
current needs.”168 The existence of a question of the moment 
creates the need for action in that moment.
Like Justice Holmes, Chief Justice Roberts wrote as though 
his decision was unremarkable and strictly in line with both 
precedent and the expectations of the judicial role. It was, in his 
view, the dissent that was taking remarkable action, ignoring 
prior precedent by “refus[ing] to consider the principle of equal 
sovereignty, despite Northwest Austin’s emphasis on its 
significance.”169 Moreover, everything about the history of the 
question pointed to the finding that a less-stringent enforcement 
 163. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2621. 
 164. Id. at 2630. 
 165. Id. at 2618. 
 166. Id.
 167. Id.
 168. Id. at 2619 (quoting Northwest Austin). 
 169. Id. at 2630. 
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of the voting-rights requirements was needed because 
circumstances had changed: In Northwest Austin, the Court had 
“emphasized the ‘dramatic’ progress since 1965.”170
So as the Chief Justice saw it, the law and the facts were on 
his side. Further, the occasion was appropriate because 
Northwest Austin had put everyone on notice that something 
needed to be done: 
[I]n issuing that decision, we expressed our broader 
concerns about the constitutionality of the Act. Congress 
could have updated the coverage formula at that time, but 
did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no 
choice but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional.”171
Finally, the action was fitting and proper for the occasion. The 
decision was no bigger than the opening that had been created, 
and took only a small step because it “in no way affects the 
permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting 
found in § 2,” and includes “no holding on § 5 itself, only on the 
coverage formula.”172
Even though others might have claimed that the right 
moment had not yet arrived, Chief Justice Roberts concluded 
that “[o]ur country has changed, and while any racial 
discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that 
the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current 
conditions.”173
VI. JUSTICE ALITO, KAIROS, AND THE GROWTH
OF CORPORATE RIGHTS
An unusually obvious setup of the most opportune moment 
occurred in Citizens United v. FEC.174 After scheduling the case 
for re-argument and adding the question of whether two prior 
 170. Id. (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 201). 
 171. Id. at 2631. 
 172. Id.
 173. Id.
 174. 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down corporate campaign-finance spending limits 
and overruling both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2013)). 
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cases should be overruled,175 the Supreme Court decided that the 
answer was yes.176 This decision meant that corporations would 
thereafter be treated as if they were individual speakers when it 
came to spending (a stand-in for the free expression protected by 
the First Amendment) in political campaigns. 
Once Citizens United had been decided, the most opportune 
moment for an argument to expand corporate rights to 
encompass religious expression appeared within grasp. As the 
Tenth Circuit wrote, “the First Amendment logic of Citizens
United . . . where the Supreme Court has recognized a First 
Amendment right of for-profit corporations to express 
themselves for political purposes” applies as well to religion.177
Thus, the Tenth Circuit could discern “no reason the Supreme 
Court would recognize constitutional protection for a 
corporation’s political expression but not its religious 
expression.”178
Indeed, apparently following just this logic, the Court 
decided in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.179 that the 
protections provided for “a person” by the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) should be extended to protect some 
corporations.180 Thus, the Court held, requiring a closely held 
corporation to provide insurance for contraceptives in violation 
of its owners’ religious beliefs was prohibited under RFRA. This 
 175. Order in Pending Case 2–3, Citizens United v. FEC, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
orders/courtorders/062909zr.pdf (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 08-205) (restoring case to 
calendar for reargument and directing parties to file supplemental briefs addressing 
whether the Court should “overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and . . . part of McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 
540 U.S. 93 (2003)”); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that “[f]ive Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case before us, 
so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to change the law”). 
 176. 558 U.S. at 365–66. 
 177. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(citation omitted). Hobby Lobby was consolidated at the Supreme Court with Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), in which the Third 
Circuit had rejected the same package of arguments. 
 178. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135.
 179.  ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 180. Id. at 2768, 2769 (pointing out that “protecting the free-exercise rights of 
corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the 
humans who own and control those companies,” and that “allowing Hobby Lobby, 
Conestoga, and Mardel to assert RFRA claims protects the religious liberty” of the families 
who control these closely held corporations). 
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holding was based on the Court’s acquiescence in the corporate 
argument that a corporation takes on the religious beliefs of its 
owners.181
Writing for the Court in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito 
captured essential moments in time by telling the story of the 
creation of the corporate plaintiffs. Isolating the creation 
moments from the chronological timeline of the case as 
docketed allowed him to distill the essence of his reasoning that 
“protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby 
Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of 
the humans who own and control those companies.”182
To construct an image of a corporate entity with religious 
beliefs, Justice Alito captured singular moments involving the 
humans who had owned and controlled those companies over 
the years. At the beginning of his description of the Hobby 
Lobby facts,183 he wrote: 
x David and Barbara Green and their three children 
are Christians who own and operate two family 
businesses.184
x Forty-five years ago, David Green started an arts-
and-crafts store that has grown into a nationwide 
chain called Hobby Lobby.185
x There are now 500 Hobby Lobby stores, and the 
company has more than 13,000 employees.186
x Hobby Lobby is organized as a for-profit 
corporation under Oklahoma law.187
 181. Id. at 2774–75. 
 182. Id. at 2768. 
 183. As before, I have presented individual sentences from this opinion as separate 
bullet points. 
 184. Id. at 2765. 
 185. Id.
 186. Id. (citation omitted). 
 187. Id.
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 21 Side A      05/10/2016   12:12:25
37853-aap_16-2 Sheet No. 21 Side A      05/10/2016   12:12:25
BERGERRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2016 12:04 PM 
CREATING KAIROS AT THE SUPREME COURT 179
x One of David’s sons started an affiliated business, 
Mardel, which operates 35 Christian bookstores 
and employs close to 400 people.188
x Mardel is also organized as a for-profit corporation 
under Oklahoma law.189
Concentrating on the long-ago creation moments of the 
corporation involved in the companion case, Justice Alito wrote: 
x Norman and Elizabeth Hahn and their three sons 
are devout members of the Mennonite Church, a 
Christian denomination. The Mennonite Church 
opposes abortion and believes that “[t]he fetus in 
its earliest stages . . . shares humanity with those 
who conceived it.190
x Fifty years ago, Norman Hahn started a wood-
working business in his garage, and since then, this 
company, Conestoga Wood Specialties, has grown 
and now has 950 employees.191
x Conestoga is organized under Pennsylvania law as 
a for-profit corporation.192
x The Hahns exercise sole ownership of the closely 
held business; they control its board of directors 
and hold all of its voting shares.193
x One of the Hahn sons serves as the president and 
CEO.194
 188. Id. (citation omitted). 
 189. Id.
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Analyzed from a kairic perspective, Justice Alito’s text first 
isolated and then projected an extreme close-up of what he 
might characterize as the essential moments. The result was a 
necessarily narrow focus on the image of these corporations-as-
religious-believers. In Justice Alito’s view, these corporate 
characters acquired the sincere religious beliefs of their human 
creators. Just as Citizens United found that corporations should 
be able to express political views, Justice Alito found that 
corporations should be protected in their free exercise of 
religion. To support this result, the essential moment in the 
chronological timeline (which for these companies covered 
between forty-five and fifty years) was not the choice to 
incorporate, not the decision to have thousands of employees 
and to expand to 500 stores, and not the decision to pay taxes 
and to be subject to health and safety regulations. Instead, the 
essential moment was the founding of a family business or a 
closely held company by a family whose members included 
Christian believers. Even in the face of neutral laws of general 
applicability, in Justice Alito’s view, these moments of 
corporate creation were the only times and places that 
counted.195
VII. CONCLUSION
The art of rhetoric seeks to capture in opportune moments 
that which is appropriate and attempts to suggest that which 
is possible.196
As a century of Supreme Court opinions has demonstrated, 
kairos helps us capture the opportune and essential moments for 
effectively pursuing change. While chronological time equips us 
with a sense of movement, measurement, and before-and-after, 
chronos renders time as a continuous grid.197 It is only through 
our use of kairos that we are able to discern openings and detect 
 195. Id. at 2767 (noting that “RFRA was designed to provide very broad protection for 
religious liberty,” and suggesting that there was no reason “to think that the Congress that 
enacted such sweeping protection put small-business owners to the choice that HHS 
suggests”).
 196. Poulakos, supra note 28, at 26.
 197. Smith, supra note 6, at 6. 
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seasons. Without chronos, we lack the necessary background; 
without kairos, we would miss the conflicts and tensions that 
lead to discovery, decision, and action. 
Critics might conclude that kairos is both relativistic and 
opportunistic. Through her understanding of kairos, the writer or 
speaker who recognizes the right time and space for a particular 
argument may be able to persuade others to adopt a position that 
is short-sighted, selfish, and unjust. Yet the concept of kairos 
itself suggests a rhetorician’s answer to the resulting dilemma, 
though that answer is naturally—perhaps inevitably—not 
completely satisfying. Not only must a rhetorical claim be made 
at the right time and within the right space, it must also be made 
in the right way. In other words, it must fit the setting, including 
the audience and the occasion for the argument. These decisions 
of timeliness and appropriateness are “artistic elements” that 
“cannot by apprehended strictly cognitively and whose 
application cannot by learnt mechanically.”198 Instead, they are 
“a matter of feeling,”199 a kind of practical wisdom that can only 
be learned and tested through experience in the world.200 And, as 
truly rhetorical questions, they are always subject to contest and 
argument. 
Reassuring too is the conclusion that the world’s 
happenings “have their own temporal frames and opportune 
times quite apart from human action especially the action of this 
or that individual.”201 Like the vintner concerned with the right 
time to harvest her grapes, the members of the Supreme Court 
must depend not only on their own art and technique, including 
their sense of kairos, but also on the conditions that make up the 
whole of legal rhetoric.202
 198. Poulakos, supra note 28, at 29 (footnote omitted).
 199.  Id.
 200. Id. at 29–30.
 201. Smith, supra note 6, at 5.
 202. See id. (pointing out that “the vintner will be concerned with the ‘right time’ to 
harvest the grapes, but, while not meaning to minimize the art and ingenuity of the vintner, 
the fact remains that this time will be largely a function of conditions—soil, temperature, 
moisture—ingredient in the growing process itself, to say nothing of the organic structure 
of the grapes and the time required for their maturation”).
